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Moral dilemma is an effective approach
to the investigation of neural mechanisms
underlying moral judgment. A typical
dilemma (e.g., the “footbridge dilemma”)
describes a hypothetical situation in which
a protagonist is faced with two exclusive
options: killing one person to save more
lives (a “utilitarian” judgment to maxi-
mize the utility), or doing nothing and
watching those people die (a deontological
judgment adhering strictly to the ethic rule
of “do not kill”). Neuroimaging (Greene
et al., 2001, 2004) and lesion studies (e.g.,
Koenigs et al., 2007) have identified the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
as a critical brain structure in resolving
the moral dilemma. However, the precise
function of vmPFC is still underspeci-
fied (Greene, 2007; Moll and De Oliveira-
Souza, 2007).
Recently, Shenhav and Greene (2014)
proposed an integrative judgment the-
ory of vmPFC. To dissociate the mech-
anisms of different mental processes in
moral judgment, they asked the partici-
pants to make one of the three types of
judgment when facing a moral dilemma:
an emotional assessment (EA), in which
the aversive-ness of both options were
assessed, or a utilitarian assessment (UA),
in which the utility value of both options
were assessed, or an integrative moral
judgment (IMJ), in which the overall
acceptability of each option was judged.
The vmPFC was more activated in the IMJ
condition than in the other two condi-
tions. Also, in contrast to the activation of
amygdala, which demonstrated a negative
correlation with the frequency of utilitar-
ian judgment in IMJ, the vmPFC acti-
vation was positively correlated with that
frequency. These results led Shenhav and
Greene to conclude that the role of vmPFC
in moral judgment is “to integrate dis-
parate value signals into a more abstract,
summary value representation.”
Still, the integrative judgment theory
cannot easily accommodate the findings
in vmPFC-damaged patients: If vmPFC
only serves to integrate the emotional sig-
nal from amygdala and other regions, then
damage to the vmPFC would allow the
aversive emotion to affect the moral judg-
ment directly, leading to more deontolog-
ical choices. This prediction contradicts
previous findings that vmPFC damaged
patients preferred the utilitarian option
(Koenigs et al., 2007) and did not gener-
ate emotional responses when endorsing a
utilitarian judgment (Moretto et al., 2010).
This discrepancy could be resolved
from an emotion regulation perspective
of vmPFC, which proposes that vmPFC
recursively appraises (or reappraises) the
affective meaning of moral events in
making moral judgment. The vmPFC gen-
erates an affective meaning to a utilitar-
ian option and re-codes the meaning in
accordance with the current goal/context
(Roy et al., 2012). The emotion regulation
view agrees with the integrative judgment
theory (Shenhav and Greene, 2014) that
vmPFC receives the emotional signal from
amygdala and other brain regions when
making moral judgment. Moreover, this
view extends integrative judgment theory
in two critical ways.
Firstly, the emotion regulation view
proposes that vmPFC plays a critical role
in generating social emotion to an option
according to the general moral principle;
while the integrative judgment theory does
not predict an affective meaning genera-
tion process or how vmPFC is involved
in such a process. Consistent with this
prediction, an fMRI study demonstrated
that vmPFC was only responsive to moral
stimuli but not to non-moral emotional
stimuli (Moll et al., 2002). In moral judg-
ment, Shenhav and Greene (2014) found
the most enhanced connectivity between
vmPFC and amygdala under the EA
condition.
According to the emotion regulation
view, when facing a moral dilemma, the
protagonist does not have a Pavlovian
emotional response to the utilitarian
option, instead, the vmPFC appraises this
option against the general moral prin-
ciple (e.g., “do not kill innocent lives”)
and interacts with amygdala to generate
an aversive emotion to this option. Mal-
function of vmPFC causes failure to gen-
erate appropriate moral emotion, which
explains why these patients were affec-
tively blunted (Anderson et al., 2006) and
showed fewer emotional responses on fac-
ing moral dilemma (Moretto et al., 2010).
As a result, the utility-calculation process
takes charge, leading to more utilitarian
decisions (Koenigs et al., 2007).
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Secondly, the emotion regulation view
hypothesizes that vmPFC re-appraises the
initial affective meaning of the utilitarian
option against the current situation/goal
(e.g., requiring all things to be consid-
ered), thus altering the strength/valence of
the emotion; while the integrative judg-
ment theory does not specify how emo-
tional meaning is recomputed after the
integration. In moral dilemmas, the re-
appraisal of the utilitarian option, which
is subserved by vmPFC, weakens the nega-
tive emotion toward this option and leads
to a more positive attitude toward a util-
itarian response. Indeed, a positive cor-
relation between vmPFC activation and
the frequency of utilitarian choice was
shown in the IMJ condition (Shenhav and
Greene, 2014), as well as a negative corre-
lation between the utilitarian response and
negative emotion toward that response
(Moretto et al., 2010).
The emotion regulation view also
explains why vmPFC-damaged patients
reject more unfair offers in the ultimatum
game. Under this view, the unfair offers
elicit a negative emotion to both healthy
controls and vmPFC-damaged patients.
The vmPFC functions to re-appraise the
unfair offers in light of the potential
gain, re-coding the negative emotion to a
more positive direction and consequently
increasing acceptance of unfair offers;
while the damage of vmPFC causes failure
to re-appraise the unfair offers and results
in more rejection of unfair offers (Koenigs
and Tranel, 2007). The emotion regulation
view can apply to the real-world dilemma
when the moral (social) standard has to be
violated because of a positive consequence
of an action (e.g., the son steals money for
a sick parent). The reappraisal of negative
affective meaning of moral violation may
vary according to how positively the conse-
quence of that action is evaluated, leading
to different judgments.
REFERENCES
Anderson, S. W., Barrash, J., Bechara, A., and Tranel,
D. (2006). Impairments of emotion and real-world
complex behavior following childhood- or adult-
onset damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc. 12, 224–235. doi: 10.1017/
S1355617706060346
Greene, J. D. (2007). Why are VMPFC patients more
utilitarian? A dual-process theory of moral judg-
ment explains. Trends. Cogn. Sci. 11, 322–323. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2007.06.004
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J.
M., and Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases of
cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment.
Neuron 44, 389–400. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2004.
09.027
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E.,
Darley, J. M., and Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI
investigation of emotional engagement in moral
judgment. Science 293, 2105–2108. doi: 10.1126/
science.1062872
Koenigs, M., and Tranel, D. (2007). Irrational eco-
nomic decision-making after ventromedial pre-
frontal damage: evidence from the ultimatum
game. J. Neurosci. 27, 951–956. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.4606-06.2007
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D.,
Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. (2007). Damage
to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral
judgements. Nature 446, 908–911. doi: 10.1038/
nature05631
Moll, J., and De Oliveira-Souza, R. (2007). Moral
judgments, emotions and the utilitarian brain.
Trends. Cogn. Sci. 11, 319–321. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.
2007.06.001
Moll, J., De Oliveira-Souza, R., Bramati, I. E.,
and Grafman, J. (2002). Functional networks
in emotional moral and nonmoral social judg-
ments. Neuroimage 16, 696–703. doi: 10.1006/
nimg.2002.1118
Moretto, G., Làdavas, E., Mattioli, F., and Di
Pellegrino, G. (2010). A psychophysiological inves-
tigation ofmoral judgment after ventromedial pre-
frontal damage. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 1888–1899.
doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21367
Roy, M., Shohamy, D., and Wager, T. D. (2012).
Ventromedial prefrontal-subcortical systems and
the generation of affective meaning. Trends. Cogn.
Sci. 16, 147–156. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2012.01.005
Shenhav, A., and Greene, J. D. (2014). Integrative
moral judgment: dissociating the roles of the
amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex. J. Neurosci. 34, 4741–4749. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.3390-13.2014
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 25 July 2014; accepted: 08 October 2014;
published online: 28 October 2014.
Citation: Hu C and Jiang X (2014) An emotion regu-
lation role of ventromedial prefrontal cortex in moral
judgment. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:873. doi: 10.3389/
fnhum.2014.00873
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Hu and Jiang. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not
comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 873 | 2
